Volume 83

Issue 3

Article 11

April 1981

U.C.C. Warranties: Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain
State Mack, Inc.
David D. Johnson III
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
David D. Johnson III, U.C.C. Warranties: Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain State Mack, Inc., 83 W.
Va. L. Rev. (1981).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss3/11

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Johnson: U.C.C. Warranties: Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain Stat

U.C.C. WARRANTIES:
MOUNTAINEER CONTRACTORS, INC.
V.

MOUNTAIN STATE MACK, INC.
In deciding the recent case of Mountaineer Contractors,Inc.
v. Mountain State Mack, Inc., the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals interpreted and relied upon certain sections of chapter forty-six of the West Virginia Code, this state's codification
of the Uniform Commercial Code.1 Given the apparent paucity of
decisions by the West Virginia court interpreting the U.C.C. in
general, and the lack of decisions interpreting article two in particular, the decision at hand is of considerable potential
significance to citizens of this state and to those who do business
here.
The facts of the case are not complex.' Appellant, Mountain
State Mack, Inc. (Mack), is a dealer in heavy equipment, a "merchant" according to the U.C.C. definition of that term.3 Appellee
Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. (Mountaineer), owns and operates
heavy equipment in conjunction with surface mining and related
activity. At Mack's suggestion, representatives of both companies flew to Tennessee to view four used bulldozers which
Mack proposed to sell to Mountaineer.
While in Tennessee, Mountaineer's representative observed
the equipment in operation, but declined to examine maintenance logs relating to the bulldozers.4 It is undisputed that the
[Hereinafter referred to as U.C.C.] Article two of chapter forty-six deals
with sales, and is a revision of the Uniform Sales Act. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-313,
dealing inter alia with express warranties by promise, § 46-2-314, dealing with implied warranties of merchantability, and § 46-2-316, dealing with exclusion of warranties, are the primary provisions of the U.C.C. invoked by the court in deciding
the case at hand.
1

2

268 S.E.2d 886, 888-89 (W. Va. 1980).

W. VA. CODE § 46-2-104 (1966).
It is unclear from the opinion whether appeliee's representative merely

declined to avail himself of the opportunity to inspect the logs, or refused to do so
after a demand by appeliant's representative that he inspect the records. This
distinction is of considerable potential significance in light of the language found

in section eight of the Official Comment to W. VA. CODE § 46-2-316. The purport of
that comment is that in order for the buyer's inspection to exclude an implied
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equipment was functional at that time. The representatives
reached an agreement during the return flight whereby Mountaineer was to purchase the bulldozers, as well as an endloader
which its representative, Mr. Liston, had apparently never seen.
Moreover, Mack promised that it would allow buyer to use the
equipment for one eight-hour shift, that Mountaineer's mechanic
could thoroughly inspect the equipment, and that Mack would
bear the cost of any needed repairs discovered during that ins:pection.
When the equipment was delivered to Mountaineer, some of
it after considerable delay, it was found to be defective. Some of
the defects were mechanical in nature while some consisted of
damage or alterations to the equipment admittedly done after
Mountaineer had viewed the machinery in operation.
Upon discovering the defects, Mountaineer immediately
telephoned Mack and gave notice that the equipment would not
be accepted in that condition. Mack then assured Mountaineer
that Mack would pay for all necessary repairs. Relying upon
these assurances, Mountainer accepted the equipment, effected
the necessary repairs, and continued to make scheduled payments to Mack. Mountaineer, however, was never reimbursed
for the cost of making these repairs.
Although the parties executed a written security agreement
signed on October 25, 1974, with regard to this sale, precisely
when that document was executed in relation to the delivery of
any of the defective equipment is unknown.
In December of 1975, Mountaineer sued in the Circuit Court
of Kanawha County on the theory that Mack had breached both
an implied warranty of merchantability and an express warranty to repair. The jury rendered a verdict for Mountaineer in the
amount of $28,501.
I.
Mountaineer contended that the sale of the equipment gave
rise to an implied warranty of merchantability pursuant to W.
warranty of merchantability arising from a sale of goods, the seller must demand

that the buyer inspect the goods, and that it is insufficient that the goods merely
be available for inspection.
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Va. Code § 46-2-314,1 and that Mack breached this warranty by
delivering the equipment in defective condition. Mack asserted
that any such warranty was excluded pursuant to W. Va. Code §
46-2-316(3)(b), 6 when Mr. Liston inspected the equipment in Tennessee, and that Mack was therefore entitled to judgment on
that issue as a matter of law." The precise tenor of the court's
resolution of this controversy is somewhat unclear, although the
end result is arguably supported by a reasonable interpretation
of the relevant sections of the U.C.C.
To begin with, the court construed the U.C.C. as providing
that a "warranty of merchantability is implied in any contract
for the sale of goods where the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind and assures the buyer that, among other
things, the goods are fit for the ordinary purposes for which
they are used."8 In this statement the court combined elements
of W. Va. Code § 46-2-313-,' dealing with express warranties, and
§ 46-2-314,1° dealing with implied warranties. To commingle the
elements of these two statutes, if such was the intention of the
court, is inappropriate. It is the very essence of an implied warranty of merchantability that it arises by operation of law
without regard to any assurances or promises made by the merchant, and regardless of the merchant's intent." Thus, it is
' W. VA. CODE § 46-2-314 (1966) provides in pertinent part:

(1) Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316) [§ 46-2-316], a warranty
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind.
8 W. VA. CODE § 46-2-316 (1966) provides in pertinent part:
(3) (b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined
the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused
to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to
defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have
revealed to him ....
268 S.E.2d at 889.
8 Id. (emphasis added).
' W. VA. CODE § 46-2-313 (1966) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
"' W. VA. CODE § 46-2-314 (1966).
ItId.
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unclear whether the latter portion of the court's statement
should be regarded as merely superfluous, or as an indication
that the court interpreted W. Va. Code § 46-2-314 as requiring
this added element. If the latter is true, there is neither textual
support for such a position in the statute, nor precedential support in other jurisdictions."
The court next focused on the question of the buyer's observation or inspection of the equipment prior to entering into a
purchase agreement, and whether the implied warranty was
thereby excluded by operation of law with regard to defects
present in the machinery upon delivery."3
W. Va. Code § 46-2-316(3)(b) provides in pertinent part that
an examination by the buyer of the goods prior to purchase can
eliminate an implied warranty "with regard to defects which an
examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to
him."" As the court recognized, this provision implies that the
warranty remains effective as to defects which the examination
would not have revealed to the buyer. Thus, Mack's argument
that the implied warranty was excluded by law when the buyer
observed the equipment in operation prior to making the contract, could have no application to the defects which, as shown
by the evidence at trial, were inflicted upon the bulldozers after
the examination took place. 5
With regard to the mechanical defects however, careful
analysis of W. Va. Code § 46-2-316(3)(b) reveals that the court ignored potentially significant considerations which bear upon

11One additional alternative interpretation of the language used by the cofirt
would be that which results when the following words are inserted: a "warranty
of merchantability is implied in any contract for the sale of goods where the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind and such warranty assures the
buyer that, among other things, the goods are fit for the ordinary purposes for
which they areused." It is perhaps unlikely that this was the intended meaning of
this statement, inasmuch as the court, if it had so intended, could easily have supplied these or similar words. The above statement would, however, comport with
both the spirit and the letter of the U.C.C. The plain meaning of the statement,

read and accepted at face value, is that which is described in the text above. The
court's phraseology is ambiguous at best.

268 S.E.2d at 889-90.
W. VA. CODE § 46-2-316(3)(b) (1966).

268 S.E.2d at 890.
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this decision. The court appears to have assumed that because
the defects were mechanical in nature, they were perforce latent and undiscoverable by the buyer's representative. Section
eight of the Official Comment to the above statute states in part:
The particular buyer's skill and the normal method of examining goods in the circumstances determine what defects are excluded by the examination.... A professional buyer examining
a product in his field will be held to have assumed the risk as to
all defects which a professional in the field ought to observe .... 16
In the 1973 decision of Chaq Oil Company v. Gardner
Machinery Corp., the Texas Court of Civil Appeals relied upon
this theory, 7 and other courts have applied the same principle in
reaching similar results.18
It would seem reasonable to assume that Mountaineer's
representative, the president of that corporation, was quite
familiar with heavy equipment. While it may be too much to
assume that he was an expert in the field, he undoubtedly posessed far greater knowledge in this regard than a layman. It is
at least arguable that in the average commercial sales situation
the professional buyer will have roughly the same degree of
practical expertise in his or her field as did Mr. Liston. However, the court made no reference to the knowledge or skill of
the inspecting buyer. Thus, it would seem that in the future,
II

§ 46-2-316 Official Comment (1966).
S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). In this case, the buyer's represen-

W. VA. CODE

17 500

tative, an engineer, observed a used crawler-tractor in operation prior to approv-

ing the purchase of the machine by his employer. The tractor later proved to be
mechanically defective. The court then held:
[T]here is no implied warranty of fitness with regard to defects which

an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to a buyer
who before entering the contract has examined the goods as fully as he

desires. Mr. Parks testified that he is an engineer and generally acquainted with the mechanics of machinery operation. If, as alleged, the

machinery was not in running condition, this should have been apparent
to Mr. Parks when the machine was operated in his presence. 500

S.W.2d at 879.
" Young & Cooper v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d 281 (1974); Richard
Mfg. Co. v. Gamel. 5 Wash. App. 549, 489 P.2d 366 (1971); Valiga v. National Food
Co., 58 Wis. 2d 232, 206 N.W.2d 377 (1973). In Young, the court held: "The particular buyer's skill and normal method of examining goods in the circumstances

determine what defects are excluded by the examination." 214 Kan. at 323, 521
P.2d at 291.
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commercial buyers in similar circumstances with more or less
the same level of expertise as Mountaineer's representive, may
be judged by a layman's standard when making inspections
prior to making a contract for sale.
Some degree of confusion is engendered by the court's formulation of the following rule as arising from this litigation.
Syllabus point number one, found also verbatim in the body of
the opinion, states:
Where there is evidence in a breach of warranty action which
could support the inference that the defects giving rise to the
alleged breach did not arise until after the buyer's examination
of the goods, the issue of whether the buyer's examination constituted a waiver of the implied warranty of merchantability
under W. Va. Code § 46-2-316(3)(b) is a proper question for jury
determination.19
Immediately preceding this statement in the body of the opinion
is a different statement of the same theory which is more
satisfactory for purposes of conceptual analysis. There the court
stated that "[a] determination of whether alleged defects giving
rise to an action for breach of warranty should have been
discovered by the buyer upon examination of the goods is
generally a question of fact for the jury."2 This statement of the
rule, which deletes the language referring to defects arising
after the inspection, has been used with slight variations by
other courts.2' Syllabus point number one on the other hand, if
not read with great care, appears as a non sequitur in light of an
examination of the cited statute.' If the defects in the goods
arose after the buyer's inspection, any inquiry into the possible
exclusion of the implied warranty should terminate. Defects
arising after the inspection obviously were not discernible by a
layman, a professional, or by anyone at the time of the inspection. If, on the other hand, the court merely intended to indicate
that the question is one for the jury where some doubt exists as
to whether the defects arose after the inspection, this would
, 268 S.E.2d at 890.
2 Id.
1 Georgia

Timberlands, Inc. v. Southern Airway Co., 125 Ga. App. 404, 188
S.E.2d 108 (1972); Kronman v. Roush Produce Co., 3 Ga. App. 152, 59 S.E. 320
(1909).
'2 W. VA. CODE § 46-2-316(3)(b) (1966).
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comport with the spirit of W. Va. Code § 46-2-316(3)(b), and with
decisions in other courts faced with the issue.2
Much of the uncertainty attending the court's treatment of
the issue concerning exclusion of the implied warranty by virtue
of the buyer's inspection of the goods might have been avoided
if the court had relied upon the language in section eight of the
Official Comment to W. Va. Code § 46-2-316. There it is stated
that "[tihere must in addition be a demand by the seller that the
buyer examine the goods fully. The seller by the demand puts
the buyer on notice that he is assuming the risk of defects which
the examination ought to reveal."24 In stating that it is not sufficient that the goods merely be available for inspection, the Official Comment gives the reader notice that the U.C.C. was intended to reject the long-standing common law tradition to the
contrary.',
II.
In addition to the theory of implied warranty of merchantability, Mountaineer at trial relied upon an assertion that assurances by Mack that the cost of all necessary repairs would be
borne by the seller gave rise to express warranties pursuant
' Supra note 21.
W. VA. CODE § 46-2-316 Official Comment, sec. 8 (1966).
1 This tradition, in the broadest sense, can be viewed as part of the evolution of the law from the most severe application of the doctrine of caveat emptor,
as expressed in the English case of Jones v. Just, L.R. 3 Q.B. 196 (1868), to the
consumer-oriented principles underlying the U.C.C. Between these two extremes
lie many stages of development exemplified by representative decisions by the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Showalter v. Chambers, 77
W. Va. 720, 88 S.E. 1072 (1916); Lambert v. Armentrout, 65 W. Va. 375, 64 S.E.
260 (1909); Watkins v. Angotti, 65 W. Va. 193, 63 S.E. 969 (1909); Hood v. Bloch
Bros., 29 W. Va. 244, 11 S.E. 910 (1886). The court appears to have begun to
recognize the existence of an implied warranty of fitness around the year 1909. In
Lambert, the court held that there was no warranty of quality in sales of chattels.
65 W. Va. at 378, 64 S.E. at 262. In Watkins, decided the same year, the court
held: "The rule is that where the sale is of a definite existing chattel, specifically
described, the actual condition of which is capable of being ascertained by either
party, there is no implied warranty." 65 W. Va. at 198, 63 S.E. at 971. Thus, in
Watkins, the court seems to imply that under certain circumstances there may
have been recognized an implied warranty of quality. Subsequent developments
in this area of the law are thoroughly discussed in Rescissionfor Breach of Seller's
Warranty, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 134 (1937).
24
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to W. Va. Code § 46-2-313.16 Mack argued that any such warranty
was excluded by the written security agreement and by W. Va.
Code § 46-2-202Y This statute referring as it does to any prior
agreement or contemporaneous oral agreement, together with
the written security agreement providing that "[n]o oral agreement, guaranty, promise, representation or warranty shall be
binding,"' would seem to exclude any express warranty which
might have arisen at the time the bargain was struck during the
return flight from Tennessee. As the court indicated however,
neither the statute nor the contractual exclusion clause would
negate the effect of the identical assurances made by the seller
to the buyer to induce acceptance of the defective goods by the
latter, assuming that such assurances were binding. 9
Unfortunately, the court's opinion contains little analysis of
the negotiations between the parties, and fails to indicate with
any clarity precisely when, in the court's opinion, the contract
was made. Nor does the opinion provide sufficient data to determine with certainty when the contract arose and how it was affected by the preceding and subsequent negotiations.
From the facts set forth in the opinion, 0 it can be assumed that
negotiations between the parties began at least in July, 1974. It
is clear that the parties reached an agreement during the return
flight from Tennessee that same month, and that they executed
a security agreement dated October 25, 1974, containing the exclusionary language quoted above. Additionally, the uncontroverted evidence showed that Mack made certain assurances
to Mountaineer by phone, and in person, to induce the latter to
accept the defective equipment. Significantly, however, it is not
revealed when the various pieces of equipment were delivered
in relation to the signing of the security agreement, nor whether
VA. CODE § 46-2-313 (1966).
W. VA. CODE § 46-2-202 (1966) provides in pertinent part:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such
terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of
any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may
be explained or supplemented ....
268 S.E.2d at 891.
268 S.E.2d at 892.
268 S.E.2d at 888.
:

W.
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any of the verbal assurances preceded the signing of the security agreement.
The court stated, with regard to these latter assurances by
seller, that "the parties here agreed to a subsequent oral modification of the contract as contained in the written security agreement."'" It is unclear however, whether the court viewed the
contract as having arisen orally, during the flight from Tennessee, with the security agreement serving as a confirmatory
memorandum thereof, or whether the security agreement was a
contract in and of itself. It would seem most probable that the
former is true. In any event, the court clearly held that such an
assurance made by the seller, long after formation of the contract, and after the buyer has expressed an intention to reject
the goods, becomes an express warranty relating back to the
original contract, and becomes a binding modification of that
contract because of the buyer's acceptance. 2
III
At trial, Mack argued that the court should render judgment for it as a matter of law not only with respect to the bulldozers, but with respect to the endloader as well. On appeal, the
court considered the bulldozers separately and upheld the jury
verdict on the basis of a breach of warranties.' With regard to
the endloader however, the court held: "The evidence here was
clearly insufficient to support a verdict for appellee with respect
to the endloader and the trial court erred in submitting the
issue to the jury."" However, this error was not reversible inasmuch as the evidence adduced respecting defects in the bulldozers alone would, in the court's opinion, support the amount of
the verdict rendered by the jury.' Thus, although the jury
reached its verdict after hearing evidence of defects in five
268 S.E.2d at 892.
u Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. 1976). In Jones, involving very
similar circumstances, the court held: "Thus, the promises made by the sellers to
the Abrianis to induce them to accept the mobile home amount to express warranties. The promise that all defects would be repaired is a promise that amounts
to an express warranty under 2-313(1}{a)." 350 N.E.2d at 645.
31

268 S.E.2d at 892.

3 Id.
83 Id.
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pieces of heavy equipment, the court held that the verdict
should stand in spite of the fact that only four of those pieces of
equipment should have been considered by the jury.
In support of the above holding the court cites five of its
earlier decisions. 8 The most recent of these cases, Burns v. Goff,
is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand and is not supportive of the court's holding.37 The Burns case involved litigation over whether either one party or the other would emerge
as having the right to use a disputed strip of land. Arriving at
such a verdict involved but two basic alternatives for the jury. In
Mountaineer Contractors on the other hand, while Mountaineer
doubtless prayed for relief in some specific amount, implicit in
that form of litigation was the realization that the jurors would
consider the evidence and, hopefully, arrive at a monetary
award in an amount perhaps lesser or greater than that prayed
for. The verdict could theoretically have ranged from some
nominal amount to a considerable sum of money. It is not at all
unreasonable to assume that, having heard evidence of defects
in five pieces of equipment, the jury's verdict was based upon
consideration of five pieces of equipment.
Each of the other four cases relied upon by the court merely
supports the general proposition that "[t]he error of a lower
court must be prejudicial to the complaining party in order to
call for a reversal upon appeal."38 It is apparent that these cases
could more appropriately be cited in support of the defendant
Mack than of the plaintiff in the case at hand.
While none of the aforementioned cases cited by the court
lends any significant support to its holding, considerable author' Burns v. Goff, 262 S.E.2d 772 (W. Va. 1980); Whittaker v. Pauley, 164

W.

Va. 1, 173 S.E.2d 76 (1970); State Rd. Comm'n v. Bowling, 152 W. Va. 688, 166
S.E.2d 119 (1969); Roberts v. United Fuel Gas Co., 84 W. Va. 368, 99 S.E. 549
(1919); Miller v. White, 46 W. Va. 67, 33 S.E. 332 (1899).
1 In Burns v. Goff, 262 S.E.2d 772 (W. Va. 1980), the litigation involved a
dispute between the owners of adjoining tracts of land over the right of one party, by virtue of prescriptive easement, to use as his own a driveway running between those two parcels and lying partially upon the other party's tract. On appeal the high court held that the trial court's application of the doctrine of estoppel was erroneous, and that the principles of prescriptive easement were controlling, but that this error was harmless inasmuch as the trial court reached the correct result with respect to the rights of the parties vis-a-vis the disputed land.
Whittaker v. Pauley, 154 W. Va. 1, 173 S.E.2d 76 (1970) (syll. pt. 3).
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ity can be found in prior decisions of the court which directly
and unequivocally support an opposite result. In McCallum v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., a personal injury suit involving an infant
plaintiff, the jury was erroneously allowed to consider the item
of medical expenses in computing its verdict." The court held
that this error was clearly prejudicial, and stated:
However, to preserve a judgment so plainly right so far as
plaintiffs general right of recovery is concerned, we will
reverse this judgment, set it aside, and remand the cause to the
Circuit Court of Marion County, with directions that unless the
plaintiff will agree on the record to release the sum of $500 of
the verdict ... the verdict be set aside, and a new trial awarded
40

In Taylor v. Sturm Lumber Co., decided one year prior to McCallum, the court in reversing and remanding stated: "Seeing
excessiveness in the verdict .... the trial court should have put
them to their election to remit one third of the amount allowed
them or suffer the verdict to be set aside, the amount of the ex4
cess being clear and free from doubt." '
The court's opinion in Mountaineer Contractors does not indicate whether the jury's verdict was in such form as would indicate how much, if any, of the verdict was based upon defects in
the endloader. Even if this amount is not readily discernible, the
earlier cases indicate that this fact should lead the court to consider reversing and remanding for a new trial rather than ignoring the problem altogether.42 In Browder v. The County Court of
Webster County,43 decided by the West Virginia court in 1960,
any application of a remittitur was rejected, but in a factual situation clearly distinguishable from that in Mountaineer Contractors. In Browder there was sharply conflicting evidence
respecting damages, thereby necessitating that the jury resolve
the dispute. Such resolution involves the formulation of a collective opinion by the jurors as to the facts. The judge, under normal circumstances, should not substitute his opinion for that of

93 W. Va. 426, 117 S.E. 148 (1923).
"Id. at 434, 117 S.E. at 151.
90 W. Va. 530, 538, 111 S.E. 481, 484 (1922).
Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1942).
',

145 W. Va. 696, 116 S.E.2d 867 (1960).
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the jury." In Mountaineer Contractors however, the evidence as
to the defects was uncontradicted.15 This case involved consideration by the jury of an erroneous element of damages, not,
as in Browder, a controverted degree or amount of damages
adhering to an element concededly part of the damage computation.
The court in Browder cited with approval the 1900 case of
Chapman v. Beltz," one of the earliest statements by the court
of the principles which were later relied upon in Taylor'7 and
McCallum." It is apparent that Browder stands as reaffirmation
of these eariler cases and of the same principle enunciated by
Mr. Leo Carlin, formerly a professor of law at West Virginia
University:
In some cases, where a remittitur would be proper if excess in
the verdict were the only error to be considered, a remittitur is
refused and the verdict is set aside because of error committed
in the course of the trial which may have affected the amount of
the verdict; as where ... illegal evidence is introduced .... [b]ut
even in these cases there is a tendency to allow a remittitur and
refuse a new trial, particularly where it is practicable to
segregate the excess due to the error.' 9
As stated earlier, the court in Mountaineer Contractors was
silent with respect to these earlier cases and the precedent
established by their holdings. Thus, it is difficult to say what
value and precedential authority remains in these decisions, and
what course the court will pursue in the future.
IV
Lastly, Mack asserted that the jury should not have been instructed that it could consider expenses incurred by Mountaineer for parts and labor used in repairing the equipment, and
for the loss of use of the equipment by the buyer for the time it
was being repaired in computing damages." The court's resolu"Id.
268 S.E.2d at 890, 892.

48 W. Va. 1, 35 S.E. 1013 (1900).
90 W. Va. 530, 111 S.E. 481 (1922).
- 93 W. Va. 426, 117 S.E. 148 (1923).
4C Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 1, 11 (1942).
47

10268 S.E.2d at 893.
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tion of this issue was based upon certain provisions of the
U.C.C.-' These sections provide that the normal measure of
damages in a case of this sort, the difference, at the time and
place of acceptance, between the value of the goods accepted
and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, may be rejected under special circumstances. When such
circumstances are shown to exist, any reasonable measure of
damages may then be used, and both incidental and consequential damages are allowed. 2
The "special circumstances" relied upon here are asserted to
have arisen as a result of a coal boom occurring at that time
which caused the price of used machinery of this sort to be inflated to a level above that for comparable new equipment.5
While the U.C.C. clearly provides for the use, in certain circumstances, of the measure of damages adopted by the court in
Mountaineer Contractors,it is not absolutely clear that this was
an appropriate case for abandoning the standard measure of
damages for breach of warranty.
That the coal industry was plagued by inflation in production costs at the time does not detract from the proposition that
the value of the equipment at the time the contract was formed
could be ascertained. Even if this value was inflated, the formula
for computing damages was nonetheless valid within the parameters of that inflation. A determination of the value of the equipment as delivered would proceed upon the usual basis in such
cases and might include subtraction of the cost of repairs from

" W. VA. CODE § 46-2-714 (1966) provides in pertinent part:

(1)Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification, he may
recover as damages for any nonconformity of tender the loss resulting
in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined
in any manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at
the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the
next section may also be recovered.
See also W. VA. CODE § 46-2-715 (1966).
m Id.
3

268 S.E.2d at 893.
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the value of the machinery contracted for." Consequential
damages could then also be considered. 5 Nonetheless, this case
must be viewed as establishing at least one indication of the
type of circumstances which will, in the future, justify discarding the standard formula for computing damages pursuant to
chapter forty-six.
CONCLUSION

A thorough reading of Mountaineer Contractors leaves little
doubt of the buyer's right to recover some measure of damages
from the seller. Unfortunately, considerable doubt remains with
regard to the effect of this decision upon the status and precise
meaning of certain sections of chapter forty-six, article two of
the West Virginia Code. Is the court's definition of the manner
in which an implied warranty of merchantability arises merely a
mistake as it appears to be, or an indication that the court has
adopted a definition diametrically opposed to that used by the
drafters of the U.C.C.? Did the court in the first syllabus point
mean to say that where there is evidence indicating that the
defects arose after the buyer's inspection, there is a jury question as to whether the buyer should have discovered them, or
did the court merely intend to say that the question is one for
the jury where some doubt exists as to whether the defects
arose after the inspection? Has the court implicitly overruled
the remittitur cases cited above, or are we to view this case
merely as a momentary departure from the rules established in
those cases? Is this case indicative of the fact that in the future
plaintiffs in breach of warranty actions will be able to abandon
with great ease the standard U.C.C. formula for computing
damages in such cases? These and other questions are unfortunately left unanswered by the opinion and may well pose problems in the future.
David D. Johnson, III

", See Neuman v. Spector Wrecking & Salvage Co., Inc., 490 S.W.2d 875
(Texas 1973).
W. VA. CODE § 46-2-714 (1966).
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